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Abstract 
 
The long-standing divide between universal and residual approaches in the field of 
social policy is also evident in the emerging agenda around social protection.  
Underpinning this divide are contrasting worldviews. Arguments in favour of residual 
approaches are frequently couched in a market-centred discourse which stresses 
efficiency, incentives and a cost-benefit calculus while those advocating universalism 
favour a state-centred discourse and normative arguments. This article attempts to 
bridge the divide by offering a pragmatic argument for incremental universalism  
which stresses the responsibilities as well as rights associated with citizenship and 
suggest the need to factor in wider economic and social externalities in estimating both 
costs and benefits.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
Since the 1970s, a combination of factors have set in train the apparently inexorable 
integration of the world’s economies (Standing, 1999; UNRISD, 1995). While these 
include a variety of economic and technological factors, politics have played a major 
role in shaping the character of this globalisation, with the ascendance of neo-liberal 
ideologies among the world’s more powerful countries spearheading the move to 
market-led growth and the downsizing of the state in most regions of the world.  
 
The scale of integration into the global economy has exposed many countries to the 
vagaries of the global capital markets, highlighting the downside of globalisation, the 
new forms of risk and periodic crises that have accompanied the emergence of new 
opportunities (World Bank, 2001; ILO, 2004).  They have drawn attention to the need 
for social protection measures to be put in place on an ex ante basis rather than in the 
aftermath of crisis, paving the way for more institutionalised systems of social 
protection in place of ex-post responses of the past.  
 
However, there is as yet little consensus on the basic principles that should inform the 
design of these systems. Instead debates on this issue appear to have reproduced the 
long-standing divide between universal and residual approaches that has characterised 
social policy debates more generally. Universal social protection, according to a recent 
UNRISD report (2010), ‘covers the entire population with adequate benefits and is 
grounded in claimable entitlements, whether derived from rights or payments by 
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institutions and individuals’ (p. 135).  Residual approaches, by contrast, target their 
efforts to those classified as ‘deserving’ or the ‘needy’.  Although the reality is closer to 
a continuum than a clear-cut divide, with many countries combining targeted and 
universal approaches,  where a country lies on this continuum ‘can be decisive in 
spelling out individuals’  life chances and in characterizing the social order’ 
(Mkandawire, 2005: p. iii).  
 
The World Bank’s early ‘risk management framework’ exemplified the residual 
approach (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999). It considered markets in credit and 
insurance to represent the optimal solution for providing protection against the 
various classes of risks to which individuals, households and communities are exposed, 
but recognised the absence or imperfections of these markets in many developing 
country contexts. It therefore accepted the need for the state to play a role in welfare 
provision - with two important caveats: that the state should not ‘crowd out’ private 
initiatives by markets, communities and households but should only intervene where 
these prove inadequate and that the development of markets-based arrangements 
should remain the long term goal.   
 
By contrast, the ILO (2004) argued that the volatility of market forces and growth of 
‘precarious jobs’ that had accompanied globalisation had highlighted the unreliability 
of markets as a source of social protection.   Such volatility was not a class-specific 
phenomenon: it threatened both rich and poor.  It therefore called for ‘a commitment 
to shared universal values, and solidarity among peoples across the world’ (p x) to 
shape a process of globalisation with a strong social dimension. A minimum level of 
social protection that could provide a ‘socio-economic floor’ to the global economy 
should form a central, undisputed aspect of this process.   
 
It was cross-class solidarity around common concerns of this kind that had given rise 
to some of the universalistic welfare states in the European context (Esping-Andersen, 
1990).  The scale of recent financial crises would appear to have provided grounds for 
a similar consensus around the need for universalist approaches in developing 
countries.  But this does not seem to have happened.  While the World Bank has 
moved away from the privileged place assigned to markets in its earlier focus on social 
risk management in favour of the more interventionist approach embodied in Guhan’s 
‘protection-prevention-promotion’ framework and widely adopted by others in the 
field,  it still  falls short of any commitment to universalism or social justice.1 
 
Research into the factors shaping patterns of social protection in different countries 
have drawn attention to the importance of prevailing norms and values as a major 
factor in determining whether there is broad-based support for redistributive policies.  
The significance of such findings is that, in democratic systems, it would be difficult to 
generate the revenue necessary to finance universal social protection without such 
support. This paper sets out to explore the possibility of building this broader based 
support for redistributive policies. The first sections of the paper examine the nature 
of the antipathy to ideas about universalism within national and international contexts. 
It finds that this antipathy appears to reflect two sets of considerations: normative 
considerations relating to the perceived fairness of universalism and practical 
considerations relating to its affordability. These are both valid concerns and need to 
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be taken seriously by those advocating redistributive measures.  The later sections of 
the paper therefore seeks to marshal arguments and evidence that do not necessarily 
reject these concerns but offer alternative perspectives on them which may be more 
conducive to universalist principles.  
 
2. The fluctuating fortunes of universalism  
 
The idea of universalism was once central to the development agenda. Most post 
colonial governments embarked on the project of nation-building on the basis of 
state-led interventions which combined capital-intensive, import-substituting 
industrialisation with a commitment to universal social policies. While social security 
measures were initially confined to the groups most closely related to the nation-
building project (civil servants, the military, industrial workers), the expectation was 
that industrialisation would gradually bring all workers into the formal labour force 
and within the orbit of formal social security –a process of progressive universalization 
‘from the strong to the weak’ (Gough, 2000). 
  
The results were rarely satisfactory, leading to systems of provision variously described 
as ‘highly truncated’ in Latin America (de Ferranti et al., 2000) and ‘patently regressive’ 
in India (Guhan, 1992). The power of vested interests within largely unaccountable 
state structures gave rise to highly bureaucratic and dualistic welfare systems which 
subsidized a privileged minority while leaving poor and socially excluded groups 
reliant on their own meagre resources or the patronage of the more powerful.  Over 
time, other factors, including population growth, inflation, and unmanageable fiscal 
deficits further widened the gap between social provision and social need.  
 
The ascendance of the neo-liberal paradigm within the international development 
community in the 1980s served to simultaneously frame the dominant critique of these 
‘old’ social policies and to limit the range of conceivable solutions.  The problem was 
articulated in terms of rent-seeking states, bloated bureaucracies, market distortions 
and inefficient and inequitable service delivery systems. The solution was therefore 
seen to lie in economic growth through liberalised market forces and the targeting of 
limited public resources to those in real need (World Bank, 1990).  As Bienefeld (1997) 
has pointed out, the discourse of the ‘new social policy’   revolved around concepts 
that had been around for some time  –decentralisation, self-reliance, popular 
participation, co-responsibility, sustainability.  What was ‘new’ was the interpretation 
given to these concepts to ensure their fit with the market-led agenda.  
 
The new social policy required both a reduction in the role of the state and a 
decentralisation of its functions to local level bodies and private institutions, including 
commercial providers and NGOs (Bienefeld, 1997; Tendler, 2000). It promised to 
empower the community by bringing design and implementation processes closer to 
the poor, replacing the old top-down, supply driven schemes with new, decentralised 
modalities, such as Social Funds.   Social Funds were initially devised by the World 
Bank as a temporary safety net to ameliorate the harsh effects of structural adjustment 
on vulnerable groups but were subsequently adopted as providing a new community- 
driven model of service delivery to the poor (Fumo et al., 2000). Though part of the 
public sector, the Funds were usually managed by semi-autonomous entities, 
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institutionally and organisationally distinct from government bureaucracies, in order to 
increase their flexibility and responsiveness to local demand.  
 
Social Funds provided small-scale financing in response to proposals put forward by 
various intermediary organisations, including local government, private firms and 
NGOs.  Principles of ‘co-responsibility’ were built into these schemes in order to 
strengthen the self-sufficiency of the poor and wean them away from dependency on 
government handouts. Cost recovery through user fees and co-financing were further 
common features intended to make social provision affordable. Finally the targeting of 
public provision to the poor would ensure that scarce resources were directed only to 
those in real need while simultaneously minimizing disincentive effects on the able-
bodied.  
 
However, the new social policies failed to counter, and often exacerbated, biases in the 
provision of social services.   For instance, reviewing the evidence on the impact of 
user fees in health and education, Reddy and Vandemoortele (1996) found that, 
despite attempts to protect the poor through price discrimination and exemption 
schemes, there had been drastic declines in utilisation rates of health and educational 
services, discernible declines in child survival rates and a widening of both income and 
gender gaps in schooling. They concluded that while user financing of certain social 
services might be desirable in the name of effectiveness and efficiency, this was not 
case for basic social services: ‘Services that generate strong positive externalities and 
whose beneficiaries are primarily the poor are not well suited for user financing’ (p. 
76).  
Social Funds also came in for sharp criticism (Kanji, 2002; de Haan et al, 2002).  
Critics challenged claims that such schemes worked in a way that was ‘decentralised, 
demand driven, participatory, low in costs and fast disbursing’ (Tendler, 2000: p. 114).  
They pointed out that the ‘demand-driven’ focus of Social Funds tended to favour the 
better placed sections of the community who were in a position to articulate demand 
and to exclude the less articulate (de Haan et al., 2002).  In many contexts, the old 
state-led, top-down and supply driven programmes appeared to have more discernible 
impacts on poverty reduction (Graham, 1996).  
Tendler’s conclusions on the basis of her review of the questionable impacts reported 
for Social Funds are worth highlighting . She pointed out that the recommendations 
put forward to address the weaknesses of the new social policies would require a 
significant increase in the finance, personnel, time and effort devoted to their 
administrative capacity, thereby compromising their acclaimed ‘leanness’ and lower 
administrative costs.  If these resources had been devoted to institutional reform of 
public administration, they might have provided a more effective means of 
incorporating concerns with inclusiveness, accountability and equity than reliance on 
non-state organisations that were likely to be dominated by local elites or private 
contractors who had no mandate to consider the public interest.  
 
Her arguments form part of a broader literature questioning the minimal role assigned 
to the state in the provision of social security and social services in the new social 
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policy and the absence of a coherent and institutionalised strategy.  While this 
literature recognises that many of the critiques of public sector provision under the 
‘old’ social policies were well- founded, it argues that the possibilities for improving 
state capacity and responsiveness should have been explored more fully before 
embarking on privatized alternatives.  
 
These critiques of the new social policy do not necessarily return us to the old state 
centred model of social provision. Harriss-White  (1995), for instance, locates the role 
of the state within a framework of welfare pluralism. She notes the important role 
played in social provisioning by markets, community-based institutions and NGOS in 
the Indian context (and elsewhere) and argues for the necessity of a role for the state 
within these fields of multiple providers but also points to the limitations of states that 
are not democratically accountable: 
 
 
‘Markets exclude…Markets, even idealised, abstract, efficient ones, respond 
to demand rather than to human needs and guarantee neither life nor 
welfare. For these, the state is a necessary – but not sufficient – guarantor.  
The state is necessary because impoverished households by themselves also 
cannot guarantee life or welfare, and because institutions of civil society (like 
NGOs) are piecemeal in scope, under-resourced and imperfectly 
accountable.  The state is not sufficient not because markets are necessary, 
but rather because the state’s legitimacy does not currently rest in an 
important way on the guaranteeing of life and decent social welfare….. ’ 
(p.143). 
 
She concludes her comments with an important caveat: ‘The state may be a 
flawed institution, but it is the only institution obliged to respond to claims for 
welfare entitlements. (p. 143)  
 
 
3. Values and attitudes towards redistributive measures: survey data 
 
Thus, while the emerging agenda around universalism reflects growing 
disenchantment with market-centred residualism, it is also mindful of the validity of 
many of the neo-liberal critiques of earlier models of state provision.  Despite this 
more pluralist approach to universalism, progress has been slow. This is not surprising 
since universalism inevitably entails some degree of redistribution from the haves to 
the have-nots within a society.  In the context of democratic societies, where such 
redistribution cannot be effected by state fiat, it requires a shared vision of the good 
society and the construction of a politically sustainable social contract which embodies 
this vision. 
 
It follows from this that the argument for redistributive social policies has to be 
located in the sphere of politics and constituency building. It cannot be reduced – as 
the case for poverty reduction often is - to a series of ‘moral precepts and a set of 
technical instruments’ (Lautier, 2006, p. 77). As Graham (2002) emphasizes, values 
and attitudes matter for the kinds of social protection measures that can be sustained 
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in a society.   Differences in values and attitudes, as captured by various surveys and 
public opinion polls,  certainly go some way towards explaining the residual place 
assigned to social welfare measures in the US compared to the more central place they 
occupy within European social democratic welfare regimes.   
 
These surveys suggest that inequality has a significant negative effect on subjective 
well-being of all income groups in Europe, although most strongly among the poor.  
In the US, on the other hand, the only groups who are made unhappy by inequality are 
left-leaning wealthy people: they are most likely to believe that chances for upward 
mobility are restricted. Graham (2002) also notes that the size of the gap between 
different classes appears to have a bearing on support expressed for redistributive 
policies. The larger the gap between the poor and the middle classes, the weaker the 
basis for cross-class transfers.  Among OECD countries, the US has one of the largest 
gaps between the middle classes and the poor as well as one of the most unequal 
income distributions (Graham, 2002; see also OECD, 20112). It would appear, 
therefore, that neo-liberal solutions which view markets as the most efficient route to 
human wellbeing and assign a residual role to the state have emanated from a context 
with a very high level of tolerance for inequality.  
 
Surveys from Latin America also suggest that support for policies which prioritise 
growth over redistribution is higher in its poorer and more unequal countries.  These 
may be precisely the countries in which rent-seeking states and highly truncated 
welfare structures have led to considerable scepticism on the part of the average 
citizen as to whether redistributive policies can be either fair or efficient (Graham, p. 
15).  Within countries, however, the findings are more predictable, with the wealthy 
more likely on average to support growth over redistribution.   
 
4. Normative and practical arguments against redistribution: debating the 
citizen’s income grant  
 
Other insights into public attitudes to redistribution are provided by debates over 
concrete proposals for some form of universal social protection that have taken place 
in a number of developing countries.  One example of this is the basic income grant 
argued for by the Basic Income European Network. This would be a universal 
minimum income guarantee to all individuals in society, thereby dispensing with 
complex and costly measures to establish eligibility.  It would cover basic needs and 
would be financed through a progressive income tax system.   Interestingly, the idea 
has generated greatest interest in South Africa and Brazil: both have among the most 
unequal income distributions in the world but both are engaged in redefining their 
social contracts after prolonged periods of political struggle.   
 
In Brazil, the proposal for a ‘citizens income’ was put forward in the Congress in 1991 
by a senator from the ruling Workers’ Party. It suggested that all adults aged 25 or 
more who earned less than 2.5 times the prevailing minimum wage would receive a 
cash transfer initially equal to 30% and later to 50% of the difference between their 
income and the minimum level.  One immediate source of resistance to the idea was 
its affordability. The proposal was modified to make it more feasible: the transfer 
would not exceed 30% but could be raised by the executive to 50% when resources became 
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available and it would be phased in gradually, beginning with the 60+ cohort and 
gradually extended till it covered all adults aged 25+ by 2000 (Suplicy, 2002). The 
challenge of affordability was thus addressed through the idea of an incremental 
approach: gradual increases in the amounts of the transfer and in the constituencies 
covered at a pace that reflected the availability of resources.  
 
A second source of resistance came from the public. The 1990s was a period when a 
series of conditional cash transfers aimed to promote children’s health and education 
in poorer families had been introduced initially at the municipal level and then 
extended through federal support. When President Lula came to power, he launched 
the Bolsa Familia programme which unified the four main cash transfer programmes 
in the country and soon thereafter sanctioned the Law of Citizen’s Basic Income 
which guaranteed the right of all Brazilians, regardless of socio-economic status, to 
receive an annual cash transfer.  
 
However, attempts by the Ministry of Social Development to dispense with the need 
to monitor compliance with program conditionality and to treat the cash transfer as a 
citizen’s income was met with strong public resistance (de Britto, 2005).  When the 
media reported that the government was failing to verify that beneficiaries were 
sending their children to school and health centres, ‘opponents from both the left and 
the right united to accuse the government of transforming a genuinely innovative 
intervention into an old-fashioned and paternalistic handout’ (p. 187).   
 
As de Britto comments, public attitudes in Brazil valued the idea of ‘co-responsibility’ 
embodied in conditional cash transfers over a policy which appeared to resemble 
paternalistic forms of social assistance from the past which they believed had created 
dependence among recipients. The conditionality appeared to have helped legitimize 
the programme in the eyes of middle class voters.   
 
In South Africa, the idea of a Basic Income Grant (BIG) gained support as a means of 
overcoming the narrow reach of the existing social security system. The trickle-down 
effects of the post-apartheid government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
policy had not materialised, the extended public works programme put in place by the 
government had generated disappointingly few jobs and, despite expansions of social 
pensions and child support grants, around 60% of the poor  did not get any social 
assistance (Hassim, 2006).  
 
The idea of BIG was put forward by an alliance of civil society organisations  led by 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the country’s main trade union 
federation (Matisonn and Seeking, 2002) .  It argued for a citizens’ grant set at a level 
that would help to reduce the poverty gap by more than 80% and that would be 
financed progressively through new taxes so as not to encroach on other areas of 
expenditure. The Taylor Committee, set up by the government to come up with 
proposals for a comprehensive social security system, favoured the idea of a basic 
income grant. While accepting the need for a comprehensive approach to social 
protection,  it emphasised the need to tackle income poverty first , arguing that 
medium and longer term programmes to address capability and asset deficits were 
being compromised by unsustainable levels of income poverty. Poor people could not 
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access health care and primary education ‘because they (did) not have even the most 
basic income for transport, food and basic clothing’ (Taylor Committee, 2002, p. 56). 
Behind the Taylor Committee’s recommendation was the belief that public works 
programmes could not create enough jobs, regardless of how ‘massive’ the expansion.  
 
The negative response from the ANC government included a number of practical 
objections: that the country lacked the administrative capacity to take on the 
management of BIG and that fiscal targets had to be defended against ‘reckless 
populism’ that would deter foreign investors (Seeking and Matisonn, 2010).  There 
were also strong normative objections.  The chief spokesman for the government 
stated that the Cabinet’s philosophy was that: ‘Only the disabled or sick should receive 
“handouts”, whilst the able-bodied adults should “enjoy the opportunity, the dignity 
and the rewards of work” (Meth, 2004, p. 10). The head of the ANC’s social 
transformation department expressed concern about the values underpinning BIG and 
the likelihood it would create dependency. She suggested linking it to public works 
projects to provide the jobless with temporary employment so that the grant would 
not be a ‘mere handout’.  
 
5. Normative and practical arguments against redistribution: debating the 
universal employment guarantee  
 
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India represents a different 
approach to universalism.  The Indian constitution recognises the right to work. 
Article 39 of the constitution urges the state to ensure that ‘citizens, men and women 
equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood’ while Article 41 stresses 
that the State ‘within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make 
effective provision for securing the right to work’.  However, aside from the 
Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme put in place in one state in the 1980s, 
India’s public works programmes had not hitherto contained any guarantees.  
 
The rising inequalities that accompanied the liberalisation of India’s economy in the 
early 1990s generated growing hostility to the short-term, ad hoc and frequently 
stigmatising nature of state interventions to reduce poverty. The idea of a nation-wide 
universal guarantee of work brought together a broad-based movement of progressive 
political parties, academics, practitioners and activists, many of whom were involved in 
nationwide campaigns for the right to food, the right to information and the campaign 
for the unorganised sector. The abysmal failure of the BJP to garner electoral support 
around the slogan of ‘India is Shining’ in a context where larger numbers of poor 
people were going hungry and communal tensions were rising provided an important 
political opening (Chopra, 2009).  The United Progressive Alliance which came to 
power in 2004 on a Common Minimum Platform was determined to take to heart the 
lessons of this failure.   
 
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2006) guarantees every household in 
rural India the right to at least 100 days of employment every year for at least one 
adult member. Employment would be in the form of casual manual labour at the 
statutory minimum wage. The Bill in principle entitles 40 million rural workers to 
employment for part of the year. The other key clauses of the Act embody responses 
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to some of the positive and negative lessons learnt from past experience and can be 
regarded as practical elements to transform a formal right into a substantive one.  
 
Opposition to the Bill was most vociferously articulated by a small but powerful  
section of the corporate sector and its allies within government. Their solutions 
expressed their scorn for the scheme. For instance, one suggested dropping cash from 
helicopters would be a more effective route to poverty reduction while another 
suggested that the ‘first best option would be to do nothing’ (Business Standard, 30th 
November, 2004).  Surjit Bhalla put forward what appeared to be one of the more 
reasonable suggestions from the Bill’s critics, proposing universal cash transfers (viz. 
citizen’s income grant) as a preferable alternative to the Employment Guarantee Act. 
However, as Jean Drèze, a key proponent of the Act, commented: ‘I leave the reader 
to guess whether this is a serious proposal or just another stick to beat the Act.  Be 
that as it may, the proposal can be easily accommodated. All one has to do is to insert 
a clause in the Act stating that if the government prefers to pay the equivalent of 100 
days’ wages to every household in a particular district, instead of organising public 
works, it is free to do so’ (Times of India, 12 August, 2005). It was clear that neither 
Drèze nor Bhalla believed that the government would take the option of a universal 
cash transfer seriously, suggesting that the policy environment for a citizen’s income 
was not particularly favourable in the Indian context.  
 
6. Addressing the normative objections to universalism: reconceptualising 
rights and obligations  
 
These debates illustrate the point made earlier that a great deal of the resistance to 
universal measures appears to revolve around both normative and practical concerns.  
We address these concerns in the rest of this paper.  The normative concerns relate to 
the creation of an unfair culture of handouts, ‘something for nothing’ and a 
dependency mentality on the part of recipients.  Yet the idea of universalism itself has 
a strong normative foundation in ideas about citizenship that runs counter to this 
view.  This section explores whether the normative underpinnings of universalism can 
be framed in ways that address the normative resistance to it. 
 
Normative arguments in favour of universalism are generally grounded in some notion 
of rights. But what are these rights and who defines them?   There are constitutions, of 
course, which commit countries to the principles of human rights. The American 
Declaration of Independence, for instance, declares: ‘We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain inalienable rights’. But these truths are clearly not self-evident to all while what 
counts as inalienable rights varies considerably between countries3.  The right to a 
basic level of social security, while enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and acknowledged in the constitutions of many developing countries, is clearly 
not sufficiently grounded in their political cultures to command the broad-based 
support needed for the realisation of this right.    
 
As Lautier (2006) argues, one way forward is to try and pin down what is received in 
exchange for citizen’s rights in order to make sure they are neither handed out nor 
received as favours but as part of a politically sustainable social contract. As he points 
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out, it may be far easier politically to guarantee the right to socio-economic security 
when something tangible is received in exchange than to guarantee it on the basis of 
some abstract moral imperative.  This suggests the need for closer attention to the 
duties and obligations that the members of any polity must observe in order to ensure 
its stability, prosperity and reproduction over time.  
 
Contribution to tax revenue, one of the basic obligations of citizenship, is also the 
most visible category of contribution in the social protection literature. Tax payers 
have been the primary beneficiaries of existing social security systems. It is also their 
perception of the balance between the costs and benefits of using tax revenue to 
finance social protection that is most likely to carry weight with the government.  Such 
tax payers may be prepared to support the extension of social protection to those 
outside their circle if it rests on clearly recognised contributions.  
 
Extending social protection beyond those who contribute to the public budget to 
those who are, or could become, economically active may be relatively easier to argue 
because of its productivity implications. The political acceptability of the employment 
guarantee scheme for a sizeable section of India’s poor population reflects the fact 
that it is based on a perceived and familiar type of contract in which wages are 
guaranteed in exchange for the obligation to provide labour. The resistance expressed 
was not articulated as opposition to the idea of guaranteed employment, but to real or 
imagined fears about government corruption and inefficiency in carrying out the 
scheme.  Equally, Bangladeshi elites who are  highly resistant to the idea of state 
responsibility in relation to social protection are nevertheless open to the idea of 
provision of education for the masses: it is seen as a means of turning a ‘burden’ into 
an ‘asset’, enabling the poor to take advantage of economic opportunities (Hossain, 
2005: p. 59).  
 
The extension of the right to social protection to the more generalized circle of 
citizens beyond workers becomes more difficult, the more tenuous their link with the 
productive economy.  It requires an expansion of the notion of ‘contribution’ from 
primarily market-based or monetized categories to other less tangible but arguably 
equally vital forms of contribution. The most obvious of these is the daily care work 
that is carried out, mainly by women and girls, on an unpaid basis in the domestic 
domain. Such work has been persistently sidelined in mainstream analysis of the 
productive economy, despite its centrality to the functioning of markets and economic 
growth.  
 
However, extending the entitlement to social protection to economically inactive 
women on the basis of their unpaid care contributions poses what Lister (1994) 
describes as ‘the contemporary variant of Wollstonecraft’s dilemma’: ‘we are torn 
between wanting to validate and support, through some form of income maintenance 
provision, the caring work for which women still take the responsibility in the 
“private” sphere and to liberate them from this responsibility so that they can achieve 
economic and political autonomy in the public sphere’  (p. 54). 
 
We see versions of this dilemma play out in the some of the discussion of cash 
transfers, mainly in Latin America, which target mothers conditional on their 
 11 
fulfilment of certain obligations with regard to the health and education of their 
children.   While, in many contexts, these transfers have represented the first time that 
women from marginalized groups have been acknowledged by the state and while 
some see it as recognition of their unpaid contributions (Suarez et al, 2006), this is not 
the ethos behind the programmes.  Instead the programmes reflect a largely 
instrumental approach to breaking the inter-generational cycle of poverty by investing 
in the human capital of the next generation of workers. They target mothers because 
such investment is seen to lie within their sphere of responsibility (Molyneux, 2007).  
However, the sums of money are extremely small and, combined with the failure to 
provide women with any support in their economic roles, reinforce a very traditional 
gender division of labour.  
 
Such critiques highlight the importance of finding ways of acknowledging the value of 
women’s unpaid care contributions that do not stand in the way of their ability to 
exercise the full rights of economic, social and political citizenship.  One way to do 
this would be to move from privatized to collective responsibility for care work. While 
conditions in themselves can help to legitimize programmes in the eyes of the tax-
paying public (as is the case with conditions attached to public works programmes), 
such conditions should not curtail women’s life chances and life options.  In this case, 
they should be seen as a stepping stone to the provision of affordable child care which 
would expand the livelihood options of women from all income groups as well as 
allowing them to participate actively in the life of the community and polity.   
 
Moving even further away from any direct relationship between rights and 
contributions is a third and more diffuse category of contributions. The duties and 
obligations specified by eighteenth century theories of political rights, such as 
defending the nation, participating in political life, paying taxes, defines what can be 
termed a ‘vertical’ model of citizenship, one organised around the relationship 
between state and society. By contrast, as Lautier points out, the fact of ‘being a 
citizen’ in today’s world implies a much wider range of obligations – ‘socially necessary 
activities’, including among other things, ‘the duty to educate one’s children, to engage 
in activities for the elderly, to participate in associative or community activities that 
affect society as a whole and that may or may not (sports, culture) be related to the 
economy, to continue one’s studies or receive further training, to preserve the natural 
environment’ (p. 93). This feeds into what we might term a ‘horizontal model’ of 
citizenship, the rights and obligations that citizens have with regard to each other 
(Kabeer, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, along with the positive duties that Lautier spells out, duties which permit 
or require action, we can also add equally important ‘negative’ duties which permit or 
require inaction: these include the social obligation to refrain from words and deeds 
which express disrespect for others, which deny their humanity and cause harm to 
their life and property.   
 
Most societies today are at some stage of the transition from older face-to-face 
communities based on acknowledged bonds forged over many lifetimes to the larger 
‘imagined’ communities of the modern nation state. The expanded notion of 
citizenship is a critical recognition of the politics of interdependence that characterizes 
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this increasingly impersonal world.  It suggests that each and every member of this 
imagined community has a role to play in shaping the fate of their community: each 
has a contribution to make that goes beyond paid work and each has a claim on others 
by virtue of that contribution.   
 
Acknowledging the claims and contributions of some sections of the community to 
the exclusion of others denies the latter a stake in the prosperity and progress of that 
community with consequences that can reverberate across the entire community.  
Crime, gang warfare, riots, insurgency and civil war are increasingly recognised as 
some of the negative externalities generated by exclusion and alienation (World Bank, 
2011).  
 
Some of the attitudes expressed by marginalised groups in micro-level studies help 
explain why this might be the case. For instance, Lister’s research into how citizenship 
was understood in the UK found that those who saw themselves as ‘outsiders’ defined 
their obligations in extremely narrow terms, encompassing only themselves or their 
immediate families. They were also more likely to believe it was justifiable to break the 
law. In research carried out by Kabeer in one of the more remote areas of northern 
Punjab in Pakistan (Kabeer et al. 2010), marginalised ethnic groups explained the high 
level of lawlessness and disorder in the area in term of the exclusion of people like 
themselves from more legitimate ways of earning a living: ‘The people who are wanted by 
the police, they come from our families. We are the people who become thieves because we are facing 
scarcity. The thieves do not come from somewhere else, they come from here’. 
 
To sum up, all ‘imagined’ societies face the challenge of constructing a sufficiently 
strong sense of belonging among citizens who are strangers to each other to give them 
a stake in their collective future, the willingness to observe those basic duties that are 
the other side of the coin to basic rights.   Those who are most excluded from the 
circle of citizenship express the greatest alienation from its values and have least stake 
in the flourishing of the communities in which they live.   It is both just and 
reasonable to argue that the extension of rights to those who have been thus 
historically marginalised must precede expectations of contributions.  
 
7. Addressing the practical objections to universalism: reconceptualising 
costs and benefits 
    
The second strand of resistance to the idea of universality rests on the practical 
grounds of affordability.  As Mkandawire points out, there is a taken-for-granted 
assumption among neo-liberal advocates of residual social policies that governments 
are confronted with an exogenously given fiscal constraint and must allocate scarce 
resources within the limits that this imposes. The targeting of public provision to the 
needy or deserving poor offers the possibility of combining greater poverty reduction 
with fewer public resources.  
 
These practical objections can be addressed on equally practical grounds but once 
again, it requires a reframing of what is at issue. In this case, we need to challenge the 
narrow and static conceptualisation of costs and benefits that characterises this strand 
of the social protection literature and to reconceptualise the relationship between 
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them. We begin by considering the issue of benefits in relation to social protection, 
both universal and targeted, and then go on to consider the costs of universality versus 
targeting.  
 
Reconceptualising benefits  
 
The equation of social assistance to the poor with a narrowly defined ‘safety net’ 
function has led policy makers to view public funding for social protection  as ‘at best 
a short-term palliative and at worst a waste of money’ (Ravallion, 2003).  
Underpinning this view is a particular model of the economy as constituted by 
representative economic agents, driven by self-interest, engaged in an unending 
competition for scarce resources in the face of market-determined set of prices and 
opportunities. Economic behaviour in this model tends to be characterised by 
constant trade-offs; welfare handouts would distort these tradeoffs and dampen the 
incentive to work.  
 
Such models do not, however, describe real world economies which are characterised 
by deficits, discontinuities, interdependencies and indivisibilities, all of which have 
varying implications for how different groups and individuals survive the present and 
plan for the future.  The persistence of ‘poverty traps’, often over generations, is 
evidence that growth patterns have failed to generate the livelihood opportunities that 
allow poor people to escape poverty.  The levels and precariousness of incomes 
earned may mean that they simply do not have the ‘effective’ demand to fulfil their 
basic needs on a predictable basis, undermining their own productivity as a result of 
under-nutrition and ill-health. Nor are they able to afford the kind of ‘lumpy’ 
investments that might help them raise their future productivity. Location in remote 
rural areas or poorly served urban ones can drive a further wedge between market 
incentives and the capacity to respond.  
 
A growing body of evidence suggest that social protection not only helps to address 
some of the critical demand deficiencies associated with poverty, but can also correct 
for these various manifestations of market failure (for reviews of this evidence, see 
Devereux and Coll-Black, 2007; Barrientos and Scott, 2008; and Kabeer, 2009).  It 
shows that while part of the social transfers to poor people have been used to improve 
nutrition levels and food security within households, with possible impacts on labour 
productivity, even the poorest families have invested part of their transfers in 
productive assets, rather than consuming it all (Schubert, 2005). Evidence of the use 
of transfers to invest in productive assets has been documented in other contexts as 
well while the ability to demonstrate the receipt of predictable and regular flows of 
income for an extended period of time, most concretely embodied in the possession 
of magnetic smart cards, has extended recipients’ access to credit sources (Barrientos 
and Scott, 2008).  
 
Social protection schemes have also enabled greater engagement with labour markets, 
not only directly through the jobs created by public works programmes, but also in 
unanticipated ways that illuminate the nature of the hidden constraints that had 
hitherto curtailed such engagement. For instance, in India, the provision of mid-day 
meals in government schools allowed female heads of low income households to work 
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longer and on a less interrupted basis since they no longer had to come home to cook 
the afternoon meal for their children Drèze and Goyal (2003).  In Brazil and South 
Africa, social pensions to the elderly helped to finance the costs of job search 
including migration in search of jobs (Soares et al. 2007; Posel et al. 2004).  In other 
contexts, it reduced the need to engage in hazardous, demeaning or illegal activities to 
earn a living: to engage in transactional sex on the part of young girls and women in 
Malawi, Kenya and Namibia (Baird et al 2011; Onyango-Oumaand and Samuels, 2012; 
Namibia NGO Forum, 2008); to take up ganyu or casual agricultural wage work, 
considered to be among the worst paid and least desirable occupation in Malawi 
(Covarrubias et al. 2012); to engage in criminal activities in Namibia (Namibia NGO 
forum, 2008) and to reduce reliance on demeaning patron client relations in India 
(Echeverri-Gent, 1988).  
 
While this body of evidence relates to the direct benefits to those in receipt of 
transfers, other studies have documented some of the positive externalities and spill-
over effects that can be generated by expanding access to social protection. Reddy and 
Vandemoortele (1996) have documented some of this evidence in relation to 
investments in health, education and sanitation.  A myopic time frame may lead to an 
underestimation of these externalities because of the time lag involved. On the basis of 
simulation exercises using African data, Appiah and McMahon (2002) show that 
investments in education had important impacts on economic growth. While some of 
these are apparent in the short term, such as employment, earnings and better health, 
there are longer term indirect effects in terms of investment rates, reduction in crime 
rates and greater stability: ‘cumulative effects large enough to affect the nation 
significantly cannot reasonably be expected for 25 years or more, and even a longer 40 
or 45 years before it is reasonable to expect that stagnant economies or chaotic 
conditions in the poorest countries to begin to turn around’. 
 
Examples of other externalities relate to investments in durable infrastructure through 
public works programmes. One of the few studies that attempted a holistic evaluation 
of the impacts of Bangladesh’s Food for Work programme was carried out in 1985 
and hence somewhat dated but it is worth citing nevertheless.  It found that 
participants on the programme used their wages to hire others to work on their farms 
as well as increasing their demand for goods and services provided by the local 
economy, generating income for farmers and traders. The building of feeder roads 
helped to link isolated communities with towns and markets, enhancing their access to 
input and output markets and lowering transaction costs.  It estimated that agricultural 
production increased by an average of 27% and per capita household income by about 
10% as a result of the direct and indirect effects of the project (WFP/BIDS/IFPRI, 
1985 
cited in Devereux and Solomon, 2006). 
 
Stepping back from these various categories of impacts and considering them in the 
aggregate, they suggest that well designed social protection programmes help to build 
more interconnected economies of the kind in which market forces are likely to 
generate more equitable outcomes. By connecting up people, places and opportunities, 
a broad-based social protection strategy can contribute to the inclusiveness of growth 
– allowing all sections of society to engage in saving and investments, to take risks and 
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access credit, to equip themselves for work, to finance the costs of finding work, to 
creating the incentives for local trade to flourish and easing mobility across 
occupations and locations in an era of constant change.  The possibility that social 
protection programmes can yield ‘double dividends’ (Barrientos, 2007),  meeting both 
their immediate safety net objectives as well as generating wider developmental 
impacts, challenges the assumption of an exogenously determined fiscal constraint on 
the use of public revenue for such programmes.  It suggests that investment in such 
programmes can offset at least some of their costs and may, in the long run, serve to 
ease this fiscal constraint.  
 
 
Reconceptualizing costs 
 
 
The view that extending public provision to those who are unable to protect 
themselves is a welfare handout has logically led to its conceptualisation as pure cost. 
If the costs of such provision, whether targeted or universal approaches, is equated 
with the value of the transfers distributed, universal programmes would appear 
obviously to cost more, given their wider coverage. By contrast, targeted approaches 
offer the promise of achieving the goal of protecting the poor at far less cost.  
 
However, targeting itself, whether individual means-testing, the use of conditionalities, 
self-targeting or the targeting of disadvantaged groups or locations, carries costs which 
have to be factored into the calculus.  There are the obvious administrative costs with 
ensuring that the eligible are reached and the ineligible excluded: this includes 
gathering information, enforcing eligibility criteria, monitoring conditions, updating 
information and so on. Then there are the costs imposed on poor people to prove 
their eligibility and claim transfer, costs that can be exacerbated by the stigma often 
attached to participating in programmes specifically meant for the poor and by the 
discretionary power exercised by the ‘minor potentates’ responsible for determining 
eligibility.  Thus there is the effort involved in providing the right documentation, the 
need to visit different offices, the queuing, the travel time, delays in disbursement, the 
demands for bribes or sexual favours. All this can introduce a degree of 
unpredictability to targeted benefits that makes it difficult for poor and vulnerable 
groups to take risks and plan for the future, undermining their developmental impact 
(a less visible cost).  
 
Furthermore, given the costs associated with ensuring that only the poor will benefit 
from social assistance, the evidence that it achieves its intended goal is not 
overwhelming.  A World Bank study of 85 targeted anti-poverty interventions in 36 
low and middle income countries found that while the median programme transferred 
25% more to individuals than would have been the case with universal programmes, a 
‘staggering’ 25% of these programs were regressive in that the poor were 
disproportionately disadvantaged (Coady et al., 2004).  The best performing 
programmes were in higher income countries, suggesting that some minimum level of 
administrative capacity is needed for such programmes to work. And finally, the 
costlier the form of targeting adopted, the more accurate it was: thus individual means 
testing performed better than self targeting.   
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Finally, there are the political costs of targeting in terms of public support foregone. 
While a purely technocratic calculus takes into account the financial, informational and 
administrative costs of different approaches, it fails to recognize the redistributive 
politics at the heart of these decisions. Put very simply, targeted programmes benefit 
those who do not have to pay for them at the expense of those who do; they  exclude 
those with political clout in favour of those with none.  
 
The result is, as has been pointed out by various authors over time, that programmes 
intended for the poor tend to be very poor quality programmes.  The most widely 
cited example of this relates to food subsidies in Sri Lanka, when the transformation 
of a universal food subsidy into a targeted food stamp program led to the steady 
erosion of the value of the transfer as the result of inflation and absence of interest on 
the part of the tax payer and had severe consequence for poverty and malnutrition 
(Gelbach and Pritchett, 2000). 
 
Gelbach and Pritchett also point to the example of a food subsidy in Colombia that 
was similarly transformed into a targeted food stamp programme. While a World Bank 
assessment of the programme commented that ‘although it seemed effective and well-
targeted…it lacked political support and was discontinued’ (p. 17). They suggest the 
possibility that the  program might have lost support ‘because of, rather than in spite  
of, the effectiveness of its targeting’ (p. 17).  Another example comes from India 
where Kochar (2004) found that the quantity of food grains taken up by poor 
households under India’s Public Distribution Scheme declined as the scheme was 
transformed from a universal to a targeted scheme, reducing or eliminating benefits to 
the non-poor.  
 
Reconceptualising the fiscal constraint 
 
As we noted, resistance to principles of universalism in social protection is frequently 
framed in terms of an exogenously determined fiscal constraint which places limits on 
the availability of domestic resources.  The arguments and evidence put forward in this 
section suggests that this way of framing the argument may be unduly rigid, ruling out 
the possibility of some degree of endogeneity to the fiscal constraint. First of all, we 
pointed to evidence that well designed social protection programmes can yield ‘double 
dividends’: providing safety nets to the poor but also achieving both immediate and 
longer term developmental impacts. Such dividends not only help to offset some of 
the immediate costs of social protection but can contribute to easing fiscal constraints 
in the longer run.   
 
The second challenge to the idea of the exogenously given fiscal constraint reflects 
political considerations.  As Mkandawire points out, the fiscal constraint is at least 
partly a matter of public policy choices about domestic revenue mobilisation. In some 
countries, structural adjustment policies have been associated with the removal of the 
state’s capacity to collect widely applied and easy to collect taxes. In other countries, 
the state itself has opted for a very minimal level of taxation because of its residual 
approach to social policy. The decision to opt for targeted rather than universal 
measures is thus closely bound up with the decision to opt for a minimal tax regime.   
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However, the political economy literature on targeting also suggests that choice of 
provision itself can influence the availability of resources (Gelbach and Pritchett, 
2000).  Targeted measures are likely to be poorer quality measures, with very little 
developmental potential, because there is little political support for them.   Not only 
are the poor more likely to benefit when they share in forms of provision with the 
better off, but the better off may be more willing to contribute to such programmes if 
they derive some benefit from it.  The debate over universal versus targeted 
programmes needs to explore in greater detail whether the fiscal constraint should be 
taken as a ‘given’ or whether the availability of financial resources for social protection 
is responsive to the accessibility of its benefits.  
 
 
Conclusion:  big bang versus incremental approaches to universalism 
 
Given the uneven nature of development across countries, and given differences in 
political culture, progress in the direction of universalist strategies is likely to be 
similarly uneven. Some countries appear to be favourably disposed towards some 
form of universalism: the basic income grant in Brazil, guaranteed employment in 
India, universal access to basic health services in Thailand; universal pensions in 
Namibia.  In others, often those characterised by high levels of inequality, there is little 
evidence of progress.  This paper has sought to put forward arguments which directly 
address the concerns of those who are resistant to the idea of redistribution on other 
than hard-core ideological grounds.  In keeping with the pragmatic tone of the analysis 
so far, we conclude the paper by arguing that the case for universalism needs to be 
framed in ways that do not set up false dichotomies or unrealistic expectations.  
 
Certain aspects of the recent discourse around universalism have not been helpful in 
building broad-based support for redistributive programmes, particularly in countries 
without any history of such programmes - and possibly hostile to them. The resort to 
a purely moral imperative to make the case for universalism overlooks the fact the 
progress in this direction in the welfare states of Western Europe was never motivated 
by moral considerations alone. It was always designed to achieve other objectives as 
well: building citizenship certainly but also to increase overall productivity and to 
ensure social stability (Esping-Anderson).  To that extent, the emerging evidence of 
the productive and political payoffs to social protection together with arguments about 
the possible endogeneity of the relationship between protective measures and fiscal 
resources helps to link citizen-centred arguments for universalism with a 
developmental rationale.  
 
The tendency to frame the move to universalism in ‘big bang’ (Lautier) or ‘all or 
nothing’ (Thomson, 2007) terms and to conflate universality with uniformity (as with 
the basic income grant) is also not conducive to building support.  Such formulations 
appear to rule out the possibility of tailoring social protection measures to local needs 
at a pace permitted by local resources. The reality is that the process took over 150 
year in Western Europe and most of it built on and extended a variety of pre-existing 
schemes, some managed by the state but others by charity, workers organisations, 
paternalistic employers and so on (Lautier).  This suggests a place for a bottom-up 
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welfare pluralism as a pathway to universalism but, as suggested by Harriss-White, 
with an important role for the state to step in at particular stages along the way to 
build on existing arrangements and ensure that no one is systematically excluded.  
 
Finally, the need to build social protection from the bottom up suggests that it must 
begin with measures that are ‘minimally decent’ rather than ‘maximally comfortable’ 
(Beetham, 1995). It was the focus on the standards achieved by rich countries that 
long hampered the ILO’s ability to respond to the needs of workers and others 
outside the formal economy.  Universalism would appear far more affordable to lower 
income countries if the movement is from the ‘weak to the strong’ rather than ‘the 
strong to the weak’ – and indeed this seems to be the form it is taking in many of 
these countries (Barrientos, 2005). This does not rule out the possibility of social 
insurance schemes that benefit those that can afford to pay nor does it rule out the use 
of targeting and conditionality in order to reach the most exclude: what Titmus (1968) 
referred to as ‘positive selectivism’. But it does suggest that attention has to be paid to 
ensure that the needs of the most vulnerable have been incorporated into public 
provision on terms that lend themselves to a process of incremental universalism.  It is 
this more pragmatic approach that seems to characterise current ILO thinking (ILO, 
2011). 
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1 See Centre for Social Protection (2011) 
2 OECD (2011) found that income inequality in the US had was worsened over time and was, 
according to 2008 figures, worse than all other OECD countries with the exception of Turkey, Chile 
and Mexico 
3 Some societies, the US included, have prioritized the negative freedoms associated with civil and 
political rights but failed to acknowledge the right to some basic level of socio-economic security while 
former socialist countries generally prioritized the latter at the expense of the former.  
